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NOTES
FDIC v. Mmahat and Mmahat & Duffy: Is Forewarned
Forearmed?
INTRODUCTION
As the estimated cost to the taxpayer of the savings and loan debacle
continues to grow, courts search not only for the deep pocket to help
absorb the cost, but also for a villain on whom to lay the blame. The
Wall Street Journal recently reported that U.S. District Court Judge
Stanley Sporkin, a federal judge in the D.C. Circuit, blamed much of
the publicized failure of the Lincoln Savings and Loan on lawyers.
According to the article, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), one
of the successor agencies to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC),' "plans to make enforcement actions against law-
yers-and other professionals, such as accountants, hired by thrifts-a
high priority in coming months." '2
As of March, 1989, the FSLIC had filed or been involved in 100
cases against more than 1500 defendants, including officers, directors,
and other professionals, seeking damages of more than seven billion
dollars for fraud and misconduct.3 By November, 1990, with 505 in-
Copyright 1991, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw.
i. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) [hereinafter FIRREAJ. Sections 401(a)(1) and 401(a)(2)
abolished both the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) and the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and established the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). The FSLIC had been the insurer
for federally insured savings and loans (S&Ls). The FHLBB was the supervisory agency
for the S&Ls, and alone was authorized to appoint the FSLIC as receiver when an S&L
could no longer meet its liabilities or obligations (the OTS took over these duties under
FIRREA). Five grounds for appointment of receiver or conservator are outlined in 12
U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A): I) insolvency; 2) dissipation of assets as the result of unsafe or
unlawful practices; 3) unsafe or unsound condition to transact business; 4) deliberate
violation of a cease and desist order; and 5) concealment of books or refusal to submit
books to examination.
The FSLIC was the original plaintiff; however, the FDIC was substituted as the party
in interest when the FSLIC was abolished in 1989. FDIC will be used throughout this
note in place of FSLIC.
2. Thrift Agency Is to Sue Some Attorneys, Others in Wake of Lincoln S&L
Decisions. Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1990, at B5, Col. I (eastern ed.).
3. S & L Fraud is Being Punished, Wash. Post, Mar 4, 1989, at A-21, Col. 3.
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vestigations underway by the Resolution Trust Corp. (RTC), about one-
third were expected to be professional liability claims against lawyers.'
The case of FDIC v. Mmahat5 deals with many of the collateral
issues which are likely to arise in future months in actions for legal
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duties brought by the FDIC against
attorneys based on their relationship to failed S&Ls. Mmahat may serve
as a warning to attorneys that the trend of the past decade of increased
actions against attorneys for legal malpractice promises to continue and
that the scope and availability of insurance coverage for liability con-
tinues to diminish. 6 It also calls into doubt whether or not law part-
nerships or legal corporations actually enjoy the freedom from liability
they believe they have.
This note will examine the facts of Mmahat, exploring both the
published opinion and additional background information not included
therein; briefly discuss legal malpractice generally; analyze the Mmahat
court's use of the doctrine of contra non valentem; and consider the
insurance indemnity claims of the law firm of Mmahat & Duffy. In
doing so, this note will consider alternative analyses using Louisiana
statutes and jurisprudence. Finally, this note will examine some of the
ramifications of this decision as it now stands and what steps attorneys
and their law firms may take to avoid in the future the type of liability
that the firm of Mmahat & Duffy encountered here.
BACKGROUND
Before discussing specific issues of Mmahat, it may be helpful to
consider some background information. John Mmahat helped found
Gulf Federal Savings and Loan in Metairie, Louisiana, in the 1960's.
He was associated with various law firms over the years, the most recent
of which was the partnership of Mmahat & Duffy. Each of these
successive law firms handled the legal aspects of Gulf Federal's real
estate transactions,' but Gulf Federal employed a Washington, D.C. firm
4. Malpractice Mayhem; RTC Officials Eye 140 Suits Against Lawyers, Legal Times.
Nov. 19, 1990, at I. See also, Thrift Office Planning Penalties Against Accountants,
Attorneys, American Banker, Nov. 14, 1990, at I.
5. 907 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1990).
6. See Goldfein, Legal Malpractice Insurance, 61 Temp. L.Q. 1285 (1988). According
to Goldfein, legal malpractice insurance premiums increased dramatically in the mid 1980's,
between 4000c and 1500%, while the actual coverage offered decreased. This premium
increase corresponded with an increase in malpractice claims against attorneys in the 1970's
amounting to four times the number reported during the 1960's. Reductions in coverage
have been evidenced by increased deductibles, reduced limits, and increased exclusions.
7. Brief of Appellee/Cross Appellant New England Insurance Co. at 6, FDIC v.
Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1990) (no. 89-3160) (hereinafter Appellee's Brief, New
England]. Mmahat & Duffy received fees from Gulf Federal borrowers as a result of
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for advice on regulatory matters.' John Mmahat served as Chairman
of the Board of Gulf Federal for the six years prior to its closure by
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) in 1986.
Most of Gulf Federal's business was in residential loans until 1982,
when, faced with a failing S&L industry, the federal government passed
the Garn-St. Germain Act,9 which eased restrictions on S&Ls, permitting
their entry into the business of commercial lending. The Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), which preceded the FDIC,10 and which
was the administering agency for the federally insured S&Ls, limited
the amount of money which could be loaned to any one borrower or
to any group of affiliated borrowers. These limits are referred to as
"loans to one borrower limits" (LTOB)."
The Gulf Federal Board of Directors had reason to believe that the
FHLBB was overlooking loans in excess of these limits, known as
overline loans.' 2 Gulf Federal, therefore, exceeded these limits in its
handling loan closings for Gulf Federal. These fees were the largest source of income of
Mmahat & Duffy, amounting to over five million dollars for the period of 1980 to 1985.
Mmahat received 70-80% of the net income of the law partnership although he was only
a 60% partner. See also Appellee Brief on Behalf of John Mmahat and Mmahat and
Duffy at 13, FDIC v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1990) (no.89-3160) (hereinafter
Appellee's Brief, Mmahati. The FSLIC entered into a court sponsored stipulation to the
following:
During the time period relevant to these proceedings, it was a common practice
in the Louisiana community for lending institutions to have close affiliations
with a law firm from which the law firm obtained a large percentage of Its
legal fees. It was a common practice during the time period relevant to these
proceedings for the borrowers from lending institutions to pay such law firms
a fee of one percent of the loan amount for title examination services or title
insurance policies.
8. Appellee's Brief, New England, supra note 7, at 29. Gulf Federal used the law
firm of Housely, Goldberg in Washington, D.C. for regulatory advice.
9. Garn-St. German Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(l)(R)
(1982).
10. The FSLIC and the FHLBB were abolished by FIRREA of 1989. The FDIC
stepped into the shoes of the FSLIC including for purposes of pursuing any ongoing
litigation. See supra note 1.
I!. Brief of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as Manager of the FSLIC
Resolution Fund, as Appellant with Respect to New England Insurance Company at 8,
9, FDIC v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1990) (no. 89.3160) (hereinafter FDIC
Appellant's Brief]. The FHLBB restricted federally insured S&Ls to a maximum loan to
one borrower of the S&L's net worth or 10% of its withdrawable accounts. For Gulf
Federal and other institutions of low or negative net worth, the LTOB limit was a
maximum of S500,000 as of May 23, 1983. Prior to 1983 the maximum was set at
$200,000.
12. Appellee's Brief, New England, supra note 7, at 5. Joe Mmahat, president of
Gulf Federal and brother of John Mmahat, attended a seminar sponsored by the FHLBB
where the policy was expressed that the FHLBB was forebearing on enforcement of the
LTOB limits. This information, coupled with the delays of four to eight months in
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effort to increase profitability. 13 Gulf Federal had an interest in making
overline loans and would have benefitted from them had they not gone
into default. It could have appeared that Mmahat had the financial
welfare of Gulf Federal in mind by ignoring these limits and that he
relied on his business judgment, as a director, in making this decision.
Further evidence of Mmahat's interest in the welfare of Gulf Federal's
viability is the fact that Mmahat and others made a capital contribution
of over 1.9 million dollars to Gulf Federal shortly before the takeover. 4
In fact, Mmahat had reason to believe that regulators deliberately forbore
in taking over Gulf Federal until this infusion of capital was completed."
Mmahat discussed Gulf Federal's overline loans with the supervisory
agent for the FHLBB, and, while the board of directors of Gulf Federal
was instructed to bring the loan portfolio into compliance with these
regulations, no effort was made by the FHLBB to force them to do
so." Ironically, in 1985, one year before the FDIC filed this suit for
malpractice, and while aware of the overline loans made by Gulf Federal,
the FHLBB requested that Mmahat take over as chief executive officer.
Mmahat retained that position until Gulf Federal's closure in 1986.
Gulf Federal, like so many other S&Ls, failed. 17 The FDIC took
over as receiver of Gulf Federal and filed suit against the officers and
.directors of Gulf Federal, an architectural firm, an advertising firm, an
responding to Gulf Federal's inquiries regarding their plan to gradually phase out loans
in excess of LTOB limits, led the Gulf Federal board to believe the FHLBB was, indeed,
exercising forbearance.
13. The law firm of Mmahat & Duffy handled title transfers for Gulf Federal; the
fees for this service were paid not by Gulf Federal, the lender, but by the debtor. Gulf
Federal collected a three percent origination fee in addition to the interest paid over the
term of the loan. At the time the loans were made, Mmahat apparently had every reason
to believe they would be repaid as planned.
14. Original Brief of Appellants John A. Mmahat and Mmahat & Duffy at 9, FDIC
v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1990) (no. 89-3160) [hereinafter Original Appellant's
Brief).
15. Id.
16. Appellee's Brief, New England, supra note 7, at 12, 13. In 1983, a letter was
issued by the supervisory-agent for the FHLBB which noted that there were thirty-five
loans over the LTOB limits and that the firm of Mmahat & Duffy was receiving substantial
legal fees for real estate closings generally. The supervisory agent had the authority to
prevent further loans in excess of the LTOB limits through issuance of a cease and desist
.order; he also had the power to terminate any attorney/client relationship between Gulf
Federal and Mmahat & Duffy, to force Mmahat off the Board of Directors, to require
Gulf Federal to pursue a malpractice suit against Mmahat, to terminate Gulf Federal's
relationship with Mmahat & Duffy, or to place Gulf Federal in receivership. See supra
note I.
17. For an interesting discussion of how the declining real estate market is now also
affecting an otherwise normally stable insurance industry, see New Victims of the Realty
Slump: Insurers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1990, § D, at 1, col. 3.
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appraiser, John Mmahat, and the law firm of Mmahat & Duffy." The
suit was iled by the FDIC on the same day as its closure of the S&L.19
Numerous claims and cross-claims were involved, but, by the time of
trial, all claims except those against Mmahat and Mmahat & Duffy had
been resolved.10
The claims against Mmahat were that he had committed legal mal-
practice and breached his fiduciary duty to Gulf Federal by failing to
give advice and, subsequently, in giving improper advice, to Gulf Fed-
eral's Board of Directors as to limits on the amount of money Gulf
could loan to one borrower. He was accused of giving this advice for
the sole purpose of gaining fees for his law firm of Mmahat & Duffy.21
Damages were claimed against Mmahat and Mmahat & Duffy for default
on seven particular overline loans, totalling thirty-five million dollars.2
These claims were joined with Mmahat's voluntary, personal suit in
bankruptcy court and were tried in the federal court for the eastern
district of Louisiana.'
The FDIC presented testimony that John Mmahat had deliberately
caused Gulf Federal to make overline loans so that his law firm of
Mmahat & Duffy could earn fees for handling these transactions. u An
expert for the FDIC testified that if Mmahat caused Gulf Federal to
make loans for the purpose of generating fees for himself and his law
firm, then his conduct violated professional fiduciary duties owed by
Mmahat and Mmahat & Duffy." After a trial by jury, the jury found
that John Mmahat and Mmahat & Duffy breached their fiduciary duties
by giving erroneous advice to Gulf Federal concerning limits on LTOB.
Judgment was in solido against John Mmahat and Mmahat & Duffy
for damages totalling thirty-five million dollars. Because the judgment
against Mmahat was for breach of fiduciary duty, it was held to be
non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.26 The parties stipulated to the trial
judge's determination of the insurance issues.
18. Original Appellant's Brief, supra note 14, at 2.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 3. New England Insurance, the professional liability insurer of both Mmahat
and Mmahat & Duffy was also sued under Louisiana's direct action statute, La. R.S.
22:655 (1978 and Supp. 1991).
21. FDIC v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546, 549 (5th Cir. 1990).
22. Id.
23. FSLIC v. Mmahat, 97 Bankr. 293 (E.D. La. 1988), aff'd sub. nom., 907 F.2d
546 (5th Cir. 1990).
24. Appellee's Brief, New England, supra note 7, at 6-7.
25. Id. at 7. Ironically, after having presented testimony that the law firm of Mmahat
& Duffy was itself dishonest, which caused it to be excluded from liability insurance
coverage, the FDIC then tried to make a case that the firm was only vicariously liable
for the malpractice of Mmahat and should be covered by insurance. It could be that this
fact alone, as much as any other, accounted for the court's finding.
26. FSLIC v. Mmahat, 97 Bankr. 293, 296 (E.D. La. 1988).
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In his defense, Mmahat claimed that he was not Gulf Federal's
attorney for regulatory matters and had given no legal advice at all
concerning LTOB limits. 27 Mmahat argued that he served in a dual
capacity as an attorney and a director and that any advice he gave as
to LTOB limits was done in his role as a director. Therefore, he argued
that he could not be guilty of malpractice because there was no attorney-
client relationship between himself and Gulf Federal as to regulatory
advice. He also claimed that his actions should be evaluated under the
business judgment standard."8 He did not serve on the loan committee
and thus did not vote on the acceptance of particular loans, nor did
he direct the loan committee to approve any of the loans in question. 9
Therefore, he claimed that the decisions on the loans were made by a
disinterested committee and should be evaluated as such.30
Another interesting aspect to this case is that although more than
one year had passed since default on the seven specified loans, the court
held that the doctrine of contra non valentem interrupted the normal
one year prescriptive period on malpractice actions' until the FDIC
could have known of the acts. Likewise, it held that, based on the
actions of Mmahat alone, not only Mmahat personally, but also the
27. Original Appellant's Brief, supra note 14, at 13-15.
28. 2 R. Mallen and J. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 20.13, at 281 (3d ed. 1989). An
often quoted definition of the business judgment rule is that:
It is a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief
that the action was in the best interest of the company. Absent an abuse of
discretion that judgment will be respected by the courts. The burden is on the
party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption.
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
29. Appellee's Brief, New England, supra note 7, at 27-29. According to New England,
there was no evidence that Mmahat acted as attorney in giving regulatory advice to Gulf
Federal when decisions on these loans were made.
30. Mmahat contended that because he took no part in the decisions on the loans
any taint of conflict present would have been removed by the vote of the disinterested
committee. See La. R.S. 12:84 (1969); but see La. R.S.12:81(C)(8) (1969) which holds
directors accountable for the actions taken by the committees. See also Rivercity v.
American Can Co., 600 F.Supp. 908 (E.D. La. 1984) and Woodstock Enterprises v.
International Moorings, 524 So. 2d 1313 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
31. See La. Civ. Code art. 3492 which says: "Delictual actions are subject to a
liberative prescriptive period of one year. This prescription commences to run from the
day injury or damage is sustained."
In the 1990 regular legislative session, Act 683 provided for the adoption of the new
La. R.S. 9:5605 (Supp. 1991), which regulates the prescriptive period which is now
applicable to all actions for legal malpractice whether based in tort or in contract. Like
the rule for medical malpractice actions, a cause of action must be brought within one
year of the date of the alleged negligence, error, or omission or within one year of its
discovery or when it should have been discovered, but in all cases, not more than three
years from the date of the alleged negligence, error, or omission.
NOTES
law partnership with which he was affiliated, was dishonest within the
exclusion clause of its malpractice insurance coverage. 2 Also, counter-
claims of negligence against the FDIC were rejected.
In finding that the malpractice was not within the scope of the law
firm's insurance coverage, the court stated that it did not "perceive that
minimizing the deliberate conduct here in question and engaging in result
oriented reasoning to force insurance coverage is the solution to the
nation's Savings and Loan crisis." 33 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court's decision on these issues. Some of the issues
presented by Mmahat will now be examined, with a critical view to the
application of Louisiana law to the facts of the case.
MALPRACTICE AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DuTY
The malpractice claims against Mmahat and Mmahat & Duffy were
originally divided into three categories: the negligence claims, claims of
bad advice, and claims of breach of fiduciary duties. The claims which
were based on negligence and mistake in handling the real estate trans-
actions themselves, which were closer to our traditional understanding
of malpractice claims, were settled out of court.34 The only claims to
reach the trial court were the malpractice claims based on Mmahat's
breach of fiduciary duty for failure to advise, and for giving erroneous
advice as to the federal LTOB limits.
The elements necessary for a legal malpractice cause of action are
the same as for other negligence actions." First, there must be the
existence of a duty which is owed, then a showing that the duty owed
was breached, and finally that there was damage which was proximately
caused by this breach. 6
The first inquiry then to arise is whether Mmahat owed a duty, as
an attorney, to advise Gulf Federal properly on the LTOB limits. Mma-
hat contended that no attorney-client relationship existed with Gulf
Federal as to these regulatory limits. On the contrary, Mmahat claimed
that any advice given to Gulf Federal was in his role as Chairman of
the Board of Gulf Federal.37 Indeed, the FDIC brought suit separately
against the officers and directors of Gulf Federal, presumably including
32. FDIC v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546, 549 (5th Cir. 1990).
33. FSLIC v. Mmahat, 97 Bankr. 293, 301 (E.D. La. 1988), aff'd sub nom., 907
F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1990).
34. Original Appellant's Brief, supra note 14, at 3. Mmahat, in his role as a director,
was included in the settlement of the claims against the officers and directors.
35. I Mallen, supra note 28, § 8.10, at 425.
36. Id. See also Cherokee Restaurant Inc. v. Pierson, 428 So. 2d 995 (La. App. Ist
Cir.), writ denied, 431 So. 2d 773 (1983).
37. See Appellee's Brief, New England, supra note 7, at 27.
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Mmahat, for breach of fiduciary duty. These claims were settled out
of court prior to trial for 1.9 million dollars."
The existence of an attorney-client relationship is based on contract
and "[a]greement or consent of an attorney to represent a client as to
a particular matter does not create an agency relationship as regards
other business affairs of the client."' 9 An attorney-client relationship
does not arise when an attorney is retained for non-legal services, even
if incidentally his legal knowledge may come into play.40 Likewise, the
fact that a person is also an attorney does not create a fiduciary
relationship. 4 Unless there is a specific showing that there is an attorney-
client relationship as to a particular transaction, the attorney cannot be
held liable for any professional negligence.42
According to Mmahat, none of the allegations by the FDIC involved
professional services by John Mmahat in his capacity as a lawyer. Neither
Mmahat nor Mmahat & Duffy received any fees or retainer for this
advice. There was no formal consultation or opinion, or evidence of
any kind that Mmahat was acting as an attorney regarding regulatory
advice as to any of the overline loans. 3 Other directors testified that
they did not remember ever soliciting advice from Mmahat regarding
the particular loans in question or receiving any advice from him in
that regard."4
Despite all of these arguments, the existence of an attorney-client
relationship is a question of fact and the jury found that an attorney-
client relationship existed between Gulf Federal and Mmahat.
The FDIC contended that Mmahat, as an attorney, directed loans
to be made for the sole purpose of collecting fees for his law firm.4
Mmahat argued in response that he did not have the power or the
authority, as an attorney, to send loan closing work to his law firm or
to cause loans to be made at all. He claimed that any fees gained by
38. FDIC v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546, 550 (5th Cir. 1990). The court below failed to
make a determination of proportionate fault as to the seven loans in question. Therefore,
the Fifth Circuit court remanded that portion of the case so that the judgment against
Mmahat and Mmahat & Duffy would be reduced by the amount of fault of the settling
officers and directors.
39. D. Horan & 0. Spellmire, Attorney Malpractice: Prevention and Defense, at 12-
2 (1989). Louisiana cases also state the same principle. See, e.g., Grand Isle Campsites,
Inc. v. Cheek, 262 La. 5, 29. 262 So. 2d 350, 359 (1972); Massey v. Cunningham, 420
So. 2d 1036, 1038 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982); Tullier v. Tanson Enterprise, Inc., 359 So.
2d 654. 659 (La. App Ist Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 367 So. 2d 773 (1979).
40. I Mallen, supra note 28, § 11.2, at 636. See also Grand Isle Campsites, 262 La.
at 29-30, 262 So. 2d at 359.
41. 1 Mallen, supra note 28, § 11.2, at 636.
42. See cases cited supra note 39.
43. See Appellee's Brief, Mmahat, supra note 7, at 10.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 5.
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Mmahat & Duffy in this regard would stem from his recommendations
made in his capacity as a director of Gulf Federal."
Mmahat claimed his actions should have been considered under the
business judgment rule because the power to decide to make loans was
delegated to a committee. An attorney, serving as a director, however,
may not abdicate his responsibility by claiming he took no part in the
decision making. Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:81(C)(8) states that: "The
designation of and delegation of authority to a committee shall not
relieve the directors of any responsibility imposed on them by law."'"
In Boisdore v. Bridgeman," an attorney, Bridgeman, assumed the
dual role of attorney and director in a small, closely held corporation.
An attorney-client relationship was established, and the court found that
Bridgeman could be sued in either capacity, as director or as attorney.
He was sued for fraud in his capacity as an attorney and was found
to have taken unjust advantage of Boisdore by withholding information
and misrepresenting the truth.49 The court stated that an attorney, serving
as a director, is held to a higher standard of care and that actions
taken in a dual role may be acceptable for a director, yet not meet
standards of conduct required of an attorney. 10
Once an attorney-client relationship has been established and a breach
of duty found, the question of~causation remains. There was no evidence
presented that any legal advice as to the loans in question was the cause
of the default on the loans. The passage of the Garn-St. Germain Act
in 1982, which allowed S&Ls to make commercial loans in addition to
home loans, was evidence of the crisis in the S&L industry, and was
an indication that the crisis was at least in part the result of the failing
economy. A direct causal relationship between the loan failures and
Gulf Federal's exceeding the LTOB limits was not established."
Using a "but for" approach to causation, one may argue that "but
for" these loans having been made, there would have been no default.
However, this type of argument can lead on endlessly, i.e. "but for"
the passage of the Garn-St. Germain Act, these loans would not have
been made at all. Mmahat did not create the S&L crisis and should
46. Id. at 27.
47. La. R.S. 12:81(C)(8) (1969).
48. 502 So. 2d 1149 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
49. Id. at 1155.
50. Id. at 1151.
51. Act no. 602 of the 1991 Regular Session of the Louisiana legislature enacted
Sections 1351 through 1354 of Chapter 18, Title 6 which provides that unless agreed in
writing attorneys and their law firms owe no greater duty in their dealings with financial
institutions than that normally required of attorneys under the Rules of Professional
Conduct and that an attorney shall be held liable only under traditional concepts of legal
malpractice.
1991]
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not be blamed for losses on loans which may have failed due to economic
factors beyond his control.
It appears that the hunt for a deep pocket is on and that attorneys
are the target of choice. As the hunt progresses, time limitations on
the institution of actions will become increasingly important. Each state
has its own applicable prescriptive periods, and there are corresponding
federal rules. How these rules interact is an unsettled question which
may affect the ultimate outcome in cases brought by the FDIC.
LI1ITATION OF ACTIONS
Contra Non Valentem
Next to be considered is the Louisiana law on prescription for
malpractice actions and how it was applied in Mmahat. Then the doctrine
of contra non valentem and some problems in its application will be
explored.
According to Louisiana jurisprudence, a cause of action for legal
malpractice is considered a tort unless an express warranty of result has
been made, or unless an attorney agrees to perform certain work and
then does nothing whatsoever. 2 Therefore, in Mmahat, the tort pre-
scriptive period would apply. Louisiana has a one year prescriptive period
on tort actions.' Therefore, any action against Mmahat for malpractice
relating to his advice to Gulf about its LTOB limits should have pre-
scribed after one year, unless prescription was interrupted, either by
legislative exception, or by the doctrine of contra non valentem.Y
There is no legislative exception to interrupt prescription under the
circumstances of Mmahat.1 The court, however, found that the one
year prescriptive period was interrupted under the doctrine of contra
non valentem, stating that the "FDIC did not own, nor could it enforce
the claims until it took over as receiver ' 56 and that the doctrine of
contra non valentem interrupted prescription until the end of the at-
torney-client relationship.
The doctrine of contra non valentem is derived from customary law,
not from legislation; nonetheless, Louisiana courts have adopted it into
their jurisprudence as an exception to the legislation governing prescrip-
52. Cherokee Restaurant, Inc. v. Pierson, 428 So. 2d 995 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 431 So. 2d 773 (1983).
53. La. Civ. Code art. 3492. See also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
54. Contra non valentem agere nulla currit praescripto is Latin for "no prescription
runs against a person unable to bring an action," Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).
55. For a discussion of legislative exceptions interrupting prescription, see Comment,
31 Loy. L. Rev. 93, 108 (1985).
56. FDIC v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546, 551 (5th Cir. 1990).
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tive limits." The doctrine's main precept is that prescription cannot run
while a cause of action is unknowable, whether from a legal cause, or
as the result of actions taken by the injuring party himself. The doctrine
is best illustrated by Corsey v. State Department of Corrections." Corsey
involved a prison inmate who was prevented from suing for negligent
injury within the prescriptive period because his mental condition, a
result of that injury, prevented him from knowing that he had a cause
of action. The Corsey court stated that the doctrine of contra non
valentem applies in the following situations:
1) Where there was some legal cause which prevented the courts
or their officers from taking cognizance of. or acting on the
plaintiff's action;
2) Where there was some condition coupled with the contract
connected with the proceedings which prevented the creditor from
suing or acting; or
3) Where the debtor himself has done some act effectually to
prevent the creditor from availing himself of some cause of
action.
Modern jurisprudence recognizes a fourth situation in which contra
non valentem is applicable: where the cause of action is not known or
reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even though his ignorance is not
induced by the defendant.' 9 However, mere ignorance is insufficient to
invoke this doctrine. A deliberate concealment by the defendant or a
situation which is beyond the control of the plaintiff is required.60
In a fairly recent line of jurisprudence, the Louisiana second and
third circuits6' developed, as a logical concomitant of the doctrine of
contra non valentem, the idea that prescription in legal malpractice cases
is automatically suspended until the end of the attorney-client relation-
ship. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Mmahat used this line of
cases as the basis for affirming that prescription had not run on the
legal malpractice cause of action, even though more than one year had
passed since default on the loans.
Although these cases hold that contra non valentem operates to
suspend prescription until the end of the attorney-client relationship, the
wisdom and necessity of extending this concept to form the basis of a
57. Comment, supra note 54, at 108.
58. 375 So. 2d 1319 (La. 1979).
59. Id. at 1321-22.
60. Wingate v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 435 So. 2d 594, 596 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 440 So. 2d 762 (1983).
61. See Montgomery v. Jack, 556 So. 2d 267 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 559
So. 2d 1377 (La. 1990); and Olivier v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. 499 So. 2d 1330
(La. App. 3rd Cir. 1986).
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new rule of law is questionable. Because the Civil Code specifically
provides that prescription runs unless there has been legislative excep-
tion,6 1 any attempt to judicially expand a rule of law which is derived
from custom should be impermissible. There is no customary law which
states that prescription is suspended until the end of the attorney-client
relationship. Without an expression of legislative intent, this purported
rule of law is contrary to the specific provisions of the Civil Code and
without the legitimation of having been derived from custom.
A better approach may be to continue the application of contra
non valentem according to the custom on which it has its foundation.
Doing so may, of course, lead to the same result, but at the same time,
adherence to the original doctrine would be maintained by requiring a
determination that the circumstances fall within one of the four cus-
tomary categories.
This view was adopted by the Louisiana first circuit in the recent
case of Succession of Bilwood Smith v. Kavanaugh.63 Bilwood Smith
involved an action for legal malpractice in which the plaintiff contended,
among other things, that because of the continuing representation by
the attorneys who handled her husband's succession, prescription for a
malpractice action against these attorneys was suspended until the end
of the attorney-client relationship." Although the court recognized that
a continuing attorney-client relationship may suspend the running of
prescription, it made clear that the "rule" used was actually the third
form of contra non valentem cited in Corsey, where "the defendant
has done some act effectually to prevent the plaintiff from availing
himself of his cause of action." 65 The court found that the relationship
between the attorney and client should be examined to determine if and
when representation ended, and whether an attorney-client relationship
continued to exist for the specific services in question, namely the
administration of her deceased husband's estate.
Adherence to this approach would result in prescription having run
on the malpractice action against Mmahat by the FDIC, since the facts
do not fall squarely within any of the four permissible categories of
contra non valentem. Two prongs of the Corsey contra non valentem
approach were used by the court in Mmahat: the second, "where there
is some condition coupled with contract which prevented the creditor
from suing," and the fourth, "where the 'cause of action is not known
or reasonably knowable by the defendant."" The court said, "FDIC
62. La. Civ. Code art. 3467 provides: "Prescription runs against all persons unless
exception is established by legislation."
63. 565 So. 2d 990 (La. App. Ist Cir.). writ denied, 567 So. 2d 1125 (1990).
64. Id. at 994.
65. Id. at 995.
66. Corsey v. State Dept. of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319 (La. 1979).
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did not own, nor could it enforce the claims until it took over as
receiver; no amount of notice would have allowed FDIC to sue before
that time." 67 What the court did not recognize in its opinion was the
fact that the FDIC was a successor agency of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (FHLBB),6' which oversaw Gulf Federal prior to its place-
ment in receivership.
Regulators for the FHLBB, as far back as 1983, knew Gulf Federal
was making loans in violation of the LTOB limits. Mmahat made no
act of concealment as to these loans. 69 The FHLBB had the authority
and power to remove the officers and directors, to place the S&L in
receivership, and to force the prosecution of any suits on behalf of the
S&L, including this one against Mmahat.70 When FIRREA 7 went into
effect in August of 1989, the FDIC stepped into the shoes of the FHLBB
for the purposes of prosecuting or defending any ongoing litigation.7 2
Therefore, while the FDIC had no specific statutory enforcement rights
prior to its takeover of Gulf Federal in 1986, it had constructive en-
forcement rights and the ability to bring suit through its predecessor
agency, the FHLBB.7 s The court, then, was technically accurate in finding
that the FDIC could not have enforced the claims against Mmahat and
Mmahat & Duffy until it took over as receiver, but this same action,
had it been pursued by the FHLBB, would have passed into the hands
of the FDIC intact.
In summary, the court applied an aberrant line of reasoning to
conclude that the malpractice cause of action against Mmahat had not
prescribed due to the interruption of prescription under the doctrine of
contra non valentem. The FDIC had both actual and constructive
knowledge74 of the default on the loans through its predecessor the
FHLBB, as well as the ability to pursue this cause of action through
that same agency. Therefore, the doctrine of contra non valentem should
not have interrupted prescription in the cause of action against Mmahat
and Mmahat & Duffy. Was it the intent of the court to allow the defeat
of state statutory prescriptive rights through the transfer of causes of
action from one federal agency to the next?
67. FDIC v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546, 551 (5th Cir. 1990).
68. See supra note 1.
69. Appellee's Brief, New England, supra note 7, at 5.
70. Id. at 13.
71. See supra note 1.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Bellamy v. Janssen 477 So. 2d 928 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985) (a case finding
constructive notice sufficient to begin the running of prescription); see also Cherokee
Restaurant, Inc. v. Pierson, 428 So. 2d 995 (La. App. 1st Cir.). writ denied, 431 So. 2d
773 (1983).
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EXCLUSION OF INSURANCE COVERAGE OF MMAHAT & DUFFY
The next issue to be discussed is the issue of exclusion of liability
coverage for the partnership of Mmahat & Duffy. As malpractice claims
have risen in number over the past years, insurance premiums for
professional liability have increased, while coverage has decreased. This
decrease has been reflected in both increased deductibles and expanded
areas of exclusion.3
The contract of insurance governs the rights of the insured to
indemnification. Professional liability contracts typically exclude coverage
for lawsuits involving other than professional conduct and for situations
where attorneys are serving in a dual role. An example is when an
attorney serves as both an officer or director of a corporation and as
corporate general counsel. Liability contracts also typically exclude any
unlawful, criminal, fraudulent or dishonest acts or omissions. 76 Although
the frequency and types of exclusions are increasing, insurance contracts
have generally been construed narrowly against the insurer because public
policy favors finding coverage. 7 In Mmahat, however, the court con-
strued the policy narrowly against the insured, Mmahat & Duffy.
In Mmahat, not only was John Mmahat excluded from professional
liability coverage, but so was the partnership of Mmahat & Duffy. This
exclusion was based on a jury determination that both the firm of
Mmahat & Duffy and John Mmahat, as insureds, were dishonest, placing
them within the policy exclusion. 8
The applicable insurance policy provision reads:
Ill-Exclusion
The policy shall not indemnify the Insured for any damages
or claim expenses as the result of any claim:
A-that results in a final adjudication that any Insured
has committed a dishonest, fraudulent, or malicious act,
error, omission or personal injury with deliberate purpose
and intent. Nothing contained in the foregoing shall exclude
coverage to any other Insured who is not so adjudged to
have committed any such act, error, omission or personal
injury as described above.
This policy shall then only pay in excess of the deductible
75. For discussions of such exclusions see 2 Mallen, supra note 28, § 28.19, at 753,
and Goldfein, supra note 6, at 1291-92.
76. Goldfcin, supra note 6, at 1291. By 1987, deductibles for large law firms were
as high as $500,000, whereas only five years earlier, in 1982, deductibles ranged from $0
to $15,000.
77. Id. at 1291-92.
78. FDIC v. Mmahat, 907 F. 2d 546, 549 (5th Cir. 1990).
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and of the full extent of the assets in the firm of any
Insured who was so adjudged to have committed any such
act, error, omission or personal injury as described above,
and any other personal assets of such Insured recovered
by the firm shall inure, to the extent of the amount paid
by this policy, to the benefit of the Company. However,
the Company will provide a defense for any such claims. 9
The question then becomes: How did a law partnership, having no
corporeal existence and acting only through its mandataries commit a
dishonest act so as to be excluded from insurance coverage?
Before answering this question, a discussion of the plain wording
of the insurance contract is needed to determine the extent of the
exclusions contemplated therein. The policy stated that it would pay
only in excess of the deductible and of the full extent of the assets in
the firm of any insured. It also specified that any other assets recovered
by the firm would inure to the benefit of the insurer.
Specifically, the policy language did not contemplate the firm of
Mmahat & Duffy under this exclusion, as evidenced by the express
language used. The exclusion of the firm was not contemplated because
the firm itself could not be adjudicated to have committed a dishonest
act with deliberate purpose and intent. It could not be so adjudicated
because a partnership, as the firm of Mmahat & Duffy was, can only
act through its mandataries or agents and thus can only be vicariously
liable for the torts of its partners as servants of the partnership.
The court failed to apply Louisiana law. As a federal court with
pendent jurisdiction, the court is obligated to apply the law of the state
in tort actions, under Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.80
The sources of law in Louisiana are legislation and custom.8 It is
appropriate to look first to the Louisiana Civil Code for guidance as
to Louisiana partnership law. Civil Code articles 2801-28 govern part-
nerships. Article 2801 provides that a partnership is a distinct entity
with independent personality. 2 Despite this legal personality, having no
corporeal existence, a partnership can only act through its mandataries
or agents. Civil Code article 2814 provides that every partner is the
mandatary of the partnership in the ordinary course of business.,
79. See FDIC Appellant's Brief, supra note II, at 15, 16. A "Named Insured"
includes the firm of Mmahat & Duffy and any of its lawyer/partners, whereas an "Insured"
refers to the "Named Insureds" and any employees or partners of the "Named Insureds."
80. 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 870 (1938) which calls for the application of state law
in all matters not specifically authorized or delegated to the United States.
81. La. Civ. Code art. I.
82. La. Civ. Code art. 2801.
83. La. Civ. Code art. 2814.
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Likewise, vicarious liability is the type of issue usually considered
to be a question of law, not of fact. Although there is no distinct codal
authority in Louisiana for the vicarious liability of a partnership for
the acts of a partner, by analogy, Civil Code article 23 2 0 can be
applied to partnerships as it is applied to other principal/agent or
mandatary relationships. Therefore, when the court charged the jury
"that the acts of the partners ... in the course of employment ...
[are] the acts of the law firm,"" it adopted a false premise and thereby
precluded the possibility of a finding of vicarious liability and concom-
itant liability insurance for Mmahat & Duffy as a covered insured.
The court relied on the Fifth Circuit case of Ashland Oil, Inc. v.
Miller Oil Purchasing Co." in finding insurance coverage was precluded
for Mmahat & Duffy. In Ashland, the court found that several officers
and employees of Rollins Corp. conspired together to intentionally cause
the improper disposal of toxic waste materials for which Rollins had
assumed responsibility. Ashland involved the interpretation of specific
policy language as to whether an accident or occurrence resulted in
damages expected or intended by the insured. The court found that
Rollins, itself, through its officers and employees, knew that hazardous
waste would be improperly disposed of and, therefore, from Rollins'
point of view, the damages were both expected and intended.8 7
The Ashland court, rather than finding vicarious liability for the
individual acts of its agent/employees, found that the injury was "the
authorized intentional act of Rollins, itself."" While this reasoning may
have yielded an equitable result from the court's frame of reference, it
does not adhere to Louisiana law.
Both the Ashland and the Mmahat courts distinguished the cases
of Rivers v. Brown" and Baltzar v. Williams,90 which found insurance
coverage for corporate entities for the intentional acts of the insured's
agents. In Rivers, the president and principal stockholder of a construc-
tion company, Brown, was alleged to have pistol whipped the plaintiff.
Brown's insurer argued that since Brown was the principal shareholder
and president of the construction company, any assault and battery
committed by Brown was "by or at the direction of the insured" and
therefore excluded from coverage. The "insured" referred to was the
84. La. Civ. Code art. 2320. states in part: "Masters and employers are answerable
for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions
in which they are employed."
85. FDIC Appellant's Brief, supra note i, at 15.
86. 678 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1982).
87. Id. at 1309.
88. Id. at 1317.
89. 168 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
90. 254 So. 2d 470 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
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corporation L.T. Brown. The court rejected this argument, finding that
the corporation as "named insured" is vicariously responsible for the
torts of its agents or employees in the course of employment.
Baltzar similarly involved an intentional tort by an employee. There,
the dispute involved policy language as to whether the town of Glenmora
either expected or intended the use of force by its town marshall. The
court found that the injury was neither expected nor intended from the
viewpoint of the town and, therefore, the town was covered by its
liability policy.
Although these cases may not seem totally persuasive to Mmahat
& Duffy's case, neither do they suggest that a corporation or a part-
nership can act other than through its agents or partners. Nor do these
cases suggest that a partnership may be other than vicariously liable for
the torts of its partners.
No authority was offered for making this leap of faith. On the
contrary, the Civil Code provides that the partnership acts through its
mandataries. Rather than adding to the law a rational rule based on
statute (as Louisiana laws are designed to be), the Ashland court has
pulled a red herring out of a hat, and the Mmahat court has gone after
the same fish.
The court seems to be drawing on an exception to the normal rule
of liability in master-servant relationships which has been used in certain
toxic tort cases. 9' In tort cases involving improper handling or disposal
of hazardous wastes, Louisiana courts have held that a partnership or
corporation may be primarily liable for the torts involving hazardous
wastes despite the fact that no master-servant relationship existed between
the corporation and the subcontractor who actually handled the haz-
ardous materials. 2 This is a result of a strong policy against the mis-
handling and negligent exposure of others to hazardous materials. This
policy is reflected in the absolute liability imposed by Louisiana Revised
Statutes 30:227693 and in Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.3, which
provides for one of only two exceptions to the prohibition of assessing
punitive damages in a tort action-for the negligent handling of haz-
ardous materials.
These same policies do not apply to Mmahat. Here the court seems
to confuse the distinction between the principal-agent relationship of a
91. See Wells v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 155 (W.D. La.), aff'd, 880
F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1989).
92. Id.
93. La. R.S. 30:2276 (1989). This statute provides for absolute liability for actual or
potential endangerment to health or the environment due to disposal or discharge of
hazardous waste. The defendant under this statute need only be the generator, transporter
or disposer of the waste, owner of the facility which produced the waste, or have contracted
for the disposal of the waste.
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partnership and a partner, and a partnership's responsibility for the
torts of its partners as servants of the partnership.
A partner is the mandatary or agent of a partnership, and when
the partner acts for the partnership, it is as if the partnership itself is
acting. This principal-agency relationship is consensual in nature and
confers contractual authority from the principal to the agent.9 Civil
Code article 2816 provides that "an obligation contracted for the part-
nership by a partner in his own name binds the partnership if the
partnership benefits by the transaction or the transaction involves matters
in the ordinary course of its business." 95 This article is a reflection of
policies prohibiting a principal from denying contracts made in its name.
This article, therefore, is inapplicable to tort liability.
In contrast, different policies are involved in assessing tort liability,
including loss allocation and deterrence. A principal-agent relationship
cannot exist for the commission of torts. An agent's torts are not
imputable to the principal, and the principal is not liable unless a master-
servant relationship exists. 96 If a master-servant relationship exists, then
the principal, as master, is vicariously liable for the torts of the agent,
its servant.97
There are no Civil Code articles which specifically delineate the
liability of a partnership for the torts of its partners. Louisiana Civil
Code articles 2317 and 2320, however, set out Louisiana's theory of
vicarious liability of a master for the acts of its servants, also known
as the theory of respondeat superior. Article 2317 says that "(w]e are
responsible, not only for the damages occasioned by our own act, but
for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom we are
answerable." Article 2320 more specifically states that "masters and
employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants
and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which they are em-
ployed." These articles reflect a policy of liability based on the status
of the master as the party most able to prevent the tort, a policy matter
involving both deterrence and risk-spreading. Article 2817 adds to the
theory of vicarious liability of a partnership for its partner's acts. It
states, "[a] partnership as principal obligor is primarily liable for its
debts. A partner is bound for his virile share of the debts of the
partnership but may plead discussion of the assets of the partnership."
Additionally, Louisiana courts have adopted common law principles
in imposing vicarious liability.98 As in common law, under Louisiana
94. See ODECO Oil & Gas Co. v. Nunez, 532 So. 2d 453 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ
denied, 535 So. 2d 745 (1988).
95. La. Civ. Code art. 2816 (emphasis added).
%. Blanchard v. Ogima, 253 La. 34, 215 So. 2d 902 (1968).
97. See La. Civ. Code art. 2320.
98. Arceneaux v. Texaco, 623 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 928, 101
S. Ct. 1385 (1980).
[Vol. 52
NOTES
law, a principal may be held liable for the negligence of its agent if
there is a master-servant relationship.
The existence of a master-servant relationship is tested by the mas-
ter's control or right to control over the servant." Liability is tested by
whether the servant acted within the scope of employment.10 Under this
theory a partnership is bound for the torts of its partners in the ordinary
course of business. Under the Uniform Partnership Act, the partnership
is vicariously liable for the torts of its partners without further proof.'0'
By answer to a special interrogatory which charged that "the acts
of the partners (or other members of the firm) in the course of em-
ployment should be considered the acts of the law firm,"'' 2 the jury
found the law firm of Mmahat & Duffy to be dishonest. Instead, the
court should have charged the jury as to whether or not Mmahat's
actions were those of a servant within the ordinary course of business.
If so, then Mmahat & Duffy should have been held vicariously liable
for Mmahat's actions and consequently afforded coverage under its
malpractice insurance policy.
REComrMNDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The decision in Mmahat' ° leaves unclear the liability of a partnership
for the torts of its partners and the extent of any liability insurance
covering the partnership. Perhaps the safest course of action is for law
firms to take preventive measures to avoid situations which may put
them at risk. With this in mind, many law firms are opting for the
organizational structure of a professional law corporation, both for tax
advantages and in seeking to limit tort liability. Lest the law corporation
naively assume that it is protected from liability such as was found in
Mmahat, the corporation should be aware that there has been disa-
greement among courts as to the liability of a law corporation for the
malpractice of an individual shareholder.
Courts have generally held that the professional law corporation is
liable to the extent of its corporate assets.' 0' In many cases, however,
courts have found that attorney/shareholders of the corporation could
be liable for the malpractice or other torts of another shareholder.' 0'
99. 1 A. Bromberg and L. Ribstein, Partnership, at 4:79 (1988). See also Blanchard
v. Ogima, 253 La. 34, 215 So. 2d 902 (1968).
100. McCaskill v. Welch, 463 So. 2d 942 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
101. 1 Bromberg, supra note 99, at 4:79.
102. FDIC Appellant's Brief, supra note 11, at 15.
103. FDIC v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1990).
104. Annotation, Attorney Malpractice-Corporate Liability, 39 A.L.R. 4th 556, 557
(1985).
105. Id. See also, generally, Comment, Incorporated Lawyers-The Veil Rises and




Under the Fifth Circuit Ashland analysis, had Mmahat & Duffy
been a professional corporation, the result would likely have been the
same.
A professional corporation, like other corporations, is created by
state statute, and the nature and extent of the corporation's liability is
usually delineated within the statute, although case law may further
refine its applicability.'10 Because the purpose of allowing the formation
of professional corporations was ostensibly to allow professional part-
nerships to take advantage of corporate tax incentives, limits on liability,
which are normally a benefit of incorporation, are not necessarily equiv-
alent to that of general corporate entities.1°7
Four different approaches to liability of officers and shareholders
of professional corporations appear to have been adopted by the states:
1) Liability remains the same as. in a partnership with share-
holders retaining liability as partners;
2) Shareholders remain personally liable only concerning the
provision of professional services;
3) The corporation and tortfeasor alone are liable; and
4) The corporation and tortfeasor alone are liable if specific
requirements for security for liability have been met.108
Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:801-815109 govern the Louisiana pro-
fessional law corporation. Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:807 states in
part:
(B) [a] shareholder shall not be personally liable for any
debt or liability of the corporation.
(C) Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed as in der-
ogation of any rights which any person may by law have against
an incorporator, subscriber, shareholder, director, officer or agent
of the corporation, because of any fraud practiced upon him,
or because of any breach of professional duty or other negligent
or wrongful act, by such person, or in derogation of any right
which the corporation may have against any such person because
of any fraud practiced upon it by him."0
106. I Mallen, supra note 28, § 5.4, at 272.
107. Id. See also Annotation, supra note 104, at 558.
108. 1 Mallen, supra note 28, § 5.4, at 273-74.
109. La. R.S. 12:801-15 (1969 and Supp. 1990).
110. La. R.S. 12:807 (1969). The official comment to this section says:
This Section provides expressly for limited liability for shareholders as such,
and for unlimited liability of corporate agents for their own wrongs, both normal
incidents of all corporations and their agents, and of the status of all professional
men who render services as agents for others.
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While it appears that shareholder attorneys in a professional law
corporation enjoy limited liability in some instances, paragraph (B) spec-
ifies that this limited liability does not apply in the case of fraud, breach
of professional duty or other negligent or wrongful acts for which the
law provides rights to the injured party."' Conceivably, this could be
interpreted to include fiduciary duties generally owed in a professional
capacity.
Louisiana's professional corporations statute is more favorable than
most to shareholder/attorneys for the breach of professional duties owed
to the firm's clients by other shareholder attorneys. No doubt, however,
a result oriented court could interpret this statute to find liability, thus
negating the advantage of limited liability generally offered by the cor-
porate form.
One way in which law firms can reduce their liability risks is by
prohibiting partners or associates from sitting on the boards of financial,
or other institutions. In recent years, there has been a decline in the
number of corporations with outside counsel on boards of directors. '2
This is the result, in large part, of substantial verdicts awarded against
directors, the frequency of these Claims, and the uncertainty as to whether
or not insurance will provide coverage."'
According to a recent study, claims against directors increased 16207c
from 1974 to 1984, with an average cost per claim of over one million
dollars." 4 In addition, the malpractice insurance of many law firms
excludes coverage for attorneys who serve on corporate boards,"' leaving
the possibility of corporate exposure for liability for the actions of the
firm's attorneys.
Other negative aspects of attorneys serving as board members include
increased exposure to RICO"' suits, claims of "conflicts of interest,"
and disqualification of the firm for future audit requests, representation
in corporate litigation, and bankruptcy representation."17 Therefore, an
attorney serving as a board member may actually reduce law firm
opportunities rather than increase them.11s
Despite the risks to the law firm, many attorneys justify their service
on the boards of institutions based on the need to establish a close
I1. Id.
112. 2 Mallen, supra note 28, § 20.11, at 270.
113. Id. See also Minto and Morton, The Anatomy of Legal Malpractice Insurance:
A Comparative View, 64 N.D.L. Rev. 547, 577-78 (1988).
114. 2 Mallen, supra note 28, § 20.12, at 275.
115. Id., § 28.22, at 760.
116. RICO is an acronym for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization, Pub.
L. No. 91.452, 84 Stat. 922. Codified as 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968.
117. 2 Mallen, supra note 28, § 20.11, at 271-78. Many times in insolvency proceedings
prior counsel are disqualified due to potential conflicts.
118. See generally 2 Mallen, supra note 28, § 20.11, at 271.72.
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relationship with a particular client, or even in order to obtain or retain
the corporation as a client." 9 Another justification is that, through
informal contacts with management and other directors, the law firm
can obtain referrals they would not ordinarily have had, but the same
results can be achieved by serving as outside counsel and regularly
attending the same board meetings.12 Particularly in smaller commu-
nities, service as a board member may be considered a necessary part
of doing business, and some corporations may try to save legal fees by
having attorneys as board members.' 2 ' Law firms should carefully review
their own particular circumstances to determine if the benefits of board
membership outweigh the risks.
Had John Mmahat not served as a board member, the claims against
him may have been easier to defend. The distinction as to what was
legal advice and also what advice was actually given may have been
easier to prove had he served in only one capacity, attorney. The court
refused to accept that he served in one capacity, as a director, and held
him responsible for violations of fiduciary duties as an attorney. The
court found these violations despite Mmahat's acting, from his per-
spective as a director, within what he thought was the best interest of
Gulf Federal.
If law firms choose, despite the risks, to allow partners or associates
to serve as officers or directors in outside institutions, they should take
measures to limit the exposure of the law firm. These steps include
having a separate law firm provide legal services, limiting personal
participation to only one role, abstaining from any vote on issues with
which the law firm may be or may become involved, and keeping a
separate accounting of any fees derived from such service.' n
There is, however, no guarantee that these steps will prevent law
firm liability. John Mmahat took steps to avoid liability, including having
a separate law firm handle regulatory matters, yet the court construed
recommendations made as part of his duties as a director to be a breach
of his fiduciary duties as an attorney, despite his protestations that he
was not general legal counsel for Gulf Federal Savings and Loan as to
regulatory matters.
CONCLUSION
This case is one which will be haunting attorneys for years to come.
There has been a tendency in the past to stray away from Louisiana's
civil law foundations and to ignore codal authority. No place is that
119. 2 Mallcn, supra note 28, § 20.12, at 273.
120. Id., § 20.12, at 271.
121. Id., § 20.12, at 274.
122. Id., § 20.13, at 278.
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more evident than here, in Mmahat. "The sources of law in Louisiana
are legislation and custom."' 2 However, when state courts begin straying
from these principles, for example, by adopting their own categories of
contra non valentem, it is no wonder that federal courts have difficulty
applying Louisiana law.
This case calls into doubt basic principles of Louisiana partnership
law, agency law, and vicarious liability. As it stands now, in the Fifth
Circuit, a partnership or corporation may be found to have itself com-
mitted a tort, through its agents or mandataries, by some unquantified
combination of agency and culpability known only to the court when
it sees it.
While the court says it will not strain to find insurance coverage
where none was intended, it appears eager to find liability and blame
and to ignore precepts of Louisiana law in doing so.
Pam Ashman
123. La. Civ. Code art. 1.
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